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THE POWER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LANGUAGE
DINO KRrrSIOTIS*
An evocative-although fierce and tragic-moment occurs in Peter
Carey's telling novel, OSCAR AND LUCNDA, when the path of an entourage
of white men hired to ferry a glass church "through country where glass
had never existed before, not once, in all time" crosses that of the Narcoo
community.' Members of the community are conscripted to help navigate
the entourage's way to its final destination at Bellinger in nineteenth cen-
tury Australia but face certain death as the reward for their efforts: "When
the white men wanted to cross Mount Dawson, the Narcoo men did not wish
them to. Mount Dawson was sacred. The young men were forbidden to go
there. It was against their law. Then the leader of the white men shot one
of the Narcoo men with his pistol. 2 This episode is but one among many of
the rape and slaughter of defenseless individuals of various local communi-
ties by certain members of the entourage, supposedly taking their cue from
their leader, their "man of authority": "You can be raging boys at night,
but, by God, you will be soldiers in the day. "3 It is the same man of author-
ity who reminds us that "[cihurches are not carried by choirboys...
[n]either has the Empire been built by angels. "4
I. I1TRODUCTION
The passage above rehearses-albeit in microcosm form-the realist
interpretation of international politics: a world that is free from all legal and
moral restraint, where powerful (and even the not-so-powerful) states pos-
sess the freedom (though perhaps not the capacity) to act on instinct, at their
own leisure and liberty, and ultimately to use force with impunity. The
world-in accordance with this interpretation-is held hostage by the pur-
suit of the national (as opposed to the international) interest: what we expect
and witness is the capricious application of power across frontiers, a world
* On sabbatical leave from the Department of Law, University of Nottingham as Visit-
ing Fellow of the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School.
1. Pnmm CAREY, OscARAmn LucmnA 374 (1988).
2. Id. at 377.
3. Id at 379-80.
4. 1d& at 401.
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in which there exists "no law or justice, no conception of right or wrong,
and no morality-only a struggle for survival in a state of war waged by
every state against every state."5 Such are the vagaries of power that have
come to characterize the nature of international relationships in realist terms
and thought. Power is the form of communication by which states interact
and understand one another. The Law, to put it at its bluntest, is what the
Power says it to be. To be sure, this system admits its own logic and ration-
ality because the world is perpetually rescued from the depths of anarchy
and its own total destruction. Power engenders its own rhythm, format and
limitations. It is self-controlled and self-corrective as enunciated in the clas-
sic doctrine of the balance ofpower; and this explains why Europe was ush-
ered into a sanctuary of peace for the better part of a century by the Vienna
Congress in 1815.6
In this short essay, I wish to consider the creative impact and potential
of international law as a new language (in broad comparative terms) for
conducting international relations and, as far as the realm of the domestic
political market is concerned, for the making of foreign policy choices, ini-
tiatives, and decisions. This is because, as a so-called language for interna-
tional relations, international law introduces states to a new communicative
medium which professes to be: more peaceful in its outlook on solving
problems; more economical as far as human and financial resources are con-
cerned; more secure in terms of the answers and solutions it provides; and,
finally, more inclusive of the participants that make up the international
system. The rhetoric and reality of might, power, force, and war are thus
gradually being displaced by a new rhetoric-or, more accurately, a new
language of law, principle, precedent, and procedure. It is in this rhetoric
that the underpinnings of a radical new reality for the conduct of interna-
tional relations are located.
II. THE NATURE OF POWER
The predominance and pervasiveness of power in global and historical
terms is best evidenced by the recurring division of the planet (its peoples
5. Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between Inter-
national Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193, 196 (1980).
6. Emerich de Vattel described the balance of power as "an arrangement of affairs so
that no State shall be in a position to have absolute mastery and dominate over the others"
in his LE DRorr DES GENs, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQUps A LA CoNDurTE ET
AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS, bk. III, ch. iii, § 47 (1758), reprinted in
JAMES BROWN ScoiT, THE CLAsSIcs OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (Michel E. Slatkine & Jiri To-
man eds., 1983). See also PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT PoWERs:
ECONOMIc CHANGE AND MILITARY CoNFuCT FROM 1500 TO 2000 29 (1987), who explains
that the "manifold rivalries" of European powers "were spilling over into transoceanic
spheres" in the age of exploration and imperial expansion. For the application of the bal-
ance of power rhetoric to Italian city-states and the decentralized European state system,
see id. at 21-22.
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and resources) into spheres of political, military, economic, religious, and
even cultural entente: hence the litany of empires and hegemonies, domin-
ions and colonies, and blocs and satellite states that have occupied (at one
time or another) the political landscape. These poignant euphemisms have
come to describe the various manifestations of power (and its respective
equilibria) at any given moment in history. The present century has, of
course, been no exception to this long-time phenomenon. It has, if any-
thing, produced its own ringing endorsement of power techniques and the
balance of power: we have witnessed, in particular, an entrenched political
and ideological divide, vividly symbolized by Winston Churchill's "Iron
Curtain." This cut the world in half for roughly forty-five years during
which time two superpowers (and their respective kingdoms) emerged from
the ashes of a second "great war"-and all to an endearing fanfare of world
constitutionalism, the rule of law, collective security, and the authority of
global institutions.
This euphoria and optimism did not last too long, even among those
who were true believers of the nouveau rigime. In the final analysis, the re-
alpolitik of the Cold War seemed to differ in no substantive respect from
what had gone before. The world continued to demonstrate the characteris-
tics of what the arch positivist Georg Schwarzenberger once labeled a soci-
ety "in which power is the overriding consideration, [and where] the primary
function of law is to assist in maintaining the supremacy of force and the hi-
erarchies established on the basis of power, and to give to the overriding
system the respectability and sanctity [which] law confers."7 So, even when
the law presented itself as a genuine alternative language to power with its
own psychology, infrastructure, and modus operandi, its single most impor-
tant contribution has been to confer "sanctity" on an old system-where the
epicenters and the exigencies of power have remained in operation. In short,
the fanfare of 1945 has been fanfare-and no more than that. But how accu-
rately does this understanding take account of the transformation within the
international system since the Second World War regarding the range of
participants in the world system, and the pioneering substantive legal devel-
opments that have occurred under the auspices and at the initiative of the
United Nations? Close scrutiny reveals that the schema of such institutions
has worked wonders for the prospect of international law as a new language
because (as Professor Ian Brownlie has observed): "[the] cadences and sub-
tleties of the process by which norms are developed, often without foresight
of the ultimate product, go far beyond the normal calculus of power and
politics.",
7. GEoRGScHWARZENBERGER, POWER PoLrrTcs 198-99 (3d ed. 1964). "Power" was de-
fined by Schwarzenberger to be "the mean between influence and force [which] distin-
guishes itself from influence by reliance on external pressure as a background threat, and
from force by preference for achieving its ends without the use of physical pressure."
GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE DYNAMcs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1976).
8. Ian Brownlie, The Relation of Law and Power, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF
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Are we to understand from this, then, that the nature of the international
system, and the nature of power in that system, has changed in any signifi-
cant measure? For Koskenniemi, the system we have exists in the "formal
sense of a shared vocabulary and a set of institutional practices that states
use for cooperation or conflict."9 It would, of course, be a dangerous folly
to assume otherwise: we do indeed live in an Orwellian world in which all
states are equal, but in which some states are more equal than others. The
concept of equality for all sovereign states (heralded by the 1919 Covenant
of the League of Nations and embraced by the 1945 United Nations Charter)
does exist-but it exists in some notional, fictional, even transcendental
way."0 Does it then follow that the "shared vocabulary" (what I term in this
essay "dhe language of international law") is an artificial creation, "a con-
trived synthesis of power and ideas"?1' Is international law a meaningful
and real counter-language to power, or are its credentials skin-deep and
ephemeral?
III. POWER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
One does not need to cast the net too far afield in the lifetime of the
United Nations to retrieve evidence which suggests that international law is
a language subdued by power--even, on occasion, spoken by lawyers!
When Dean Acheson addressed the 1963 Proceedings of the American Soci-
ety of International Law on America's quarantine of Cuba in 1962, he was
frank and adamant that "[the power, position and prestige of the United
States had been challenged by another state; and the law simply does not
deal with such questions of ultimate power-power that comes close to the
sources of sovereignty."' 2 Implicit in this statement was an acceptance of
some (though unspecified) significance for international law in foreign pol-
icy matters, but the overriding message and impression of these words was
that power prevails over whatever the law prescribes. "Ultimate power" is a
trump card for all occasions and all seasons; the law, on the other hand,
would seem to play a loyal second-fiddle.
This, however, is a most curious denial by Dean Acheson of the in-
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS iN HONOuR OF GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER ON HIS EIGHTIETH
BIRTHDAY 19, 22 (Bin Cheng & E.D. Brown eds., 1988). For a more detailed study, see the
seminal work of ROSALYN HIGGINS, THs DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963).
9. Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 397, 404 (1991)
[hereinafter Statehood].
10. Although, for the view that "though the world of big and small and strong and
weak states reflected in the United Nations Charter persists, the sharp asymmetries of 1945
have given way to complex international interdependencies," see W. Michael Reisman, The
Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. L INT'LL. 83 (1993).
11. Koskenniemi, Statehood, supra note 9.
12. Dean Acheson, Remarks before the American Society of International Law (Apr.
25, 1963), in 57 ASIL PROC. 13, 14 (1963).
[Vol. 34
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tended impact of international law in such situations given the provisions in
the United Nations Charter which deal precisely with the concerns he identi-
fied in 1963: national security is assured by the right of self-defense in Arti-
cle 51, and the responsibility for international security is entrusted to the Se-
curity Council (Chapter VII) and regional bodies (Chapter VIII). Indeed,
Acheson had himself spoken the language of international law and legal ar-
gument by invoking the right of self-defense when participating in the delib-
erations of the Executive Committee (a specialist branch of the National Se-
curity Council formed in October 1962 to deal with the imminent crisis).
He viewed the right of self-defense as the most secure legal footing for
whatever action (including military measures) President Kennedy ultimately
chose to take.'3
The repeated appearance of "international law talk" around the circle of
power of the Executive Committee (principally revolving around the inter-
pretations of the right of self-defense, and the relationship between regional
action through the Organisation of American States and the enforcement
powers of the Security Council) all took place behind closed doors; this is
perhaps why international law appears so complicitous with the inner
workings of the power machine of national defense. All the more reason we
are entitled to ask why international legal language and argument surfaced at
all in these deliberations-especially in a forum so conspicuously "close to
the sources of sovereignty." This very fact should not, of course, delude us
into thinking that because legal language was one of the tongues of the
Committee, it was the dominant tongue and that international law consid-
erations were the deciding factors in shaping the final decision of President
Kennedy and his Administration. The acute insight of Professor Abram
Chayes focuses our minds on the need for realistic expectations of what in-
ternational law argument can and cannot do, and of what we can and cannot
know about the rationale for a given decision. "We cannot," he argued in
1974, "ask for a demonstration that legal considerations dictated [the final]
decision":
The military advice to the President was for an immediate invasion of
Cuba or for a massive air strike, involving some 500 sorties. This course
was supported by the most prominent practitioners of realpolitik among
the President's advisers. It was their views the President rejected, not
the lawyers'.
We would not conclude from this that military considerations played no
13. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MIsSILE CRISIS 13-14 (1974) (discussing the com-
position of the Executive Committee). See also ROBERT KENNEDY, THITEEN DAYS 30
(1969). Robert Kennedy, himself a lawyer and Attorney General of the United States at the
time of the Crisis, was a fully-fledged member of the Executive Committee and advised
against a surprise attack on Cuba, akin to that made on Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces in
December 1941, because it was "not in our tradition." THE KENNEDY TAPES: INSIDE THE
WHrrE HousE DuinmG TmE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 189 (Ernest R. May & Philip D. Zelikow
eds., 1997).
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role in the decision-making process. Conversely, I do not base a claim
for the role of law on the congruence of the final decision with the law-
yers' advice. It is no more possible to demonstrate "proximate" causa-
tion here than in any other human process. The weight and consequence
of legal advice in the final decision, like the weight and consequence of
military judgment or Kennedy's machismo or the bureaucratic rigidity of
the Air Force are, and must remain, unknowable.14
This gives us, as lawyers, a sense of perspective and emphasizes the
holistic context in which decisions are made. The imponderabilities that
belie the decision making process and the "unknowable" mechanics of "the
final decision" should not, however, serve to detract from the increasing in-
fluence that international law has as a language for inter-state and even intra-
state intercourse. No formal obligation is placed on states outside the arena
of litigation or official reporting commitments to justify their actions in in-
ternational law and, yet, we find that even the most powerful states invoke
international law principles and argument to defend their conduct. The
United States is a principal case-in-point, offering legal arguments to ex-
plain why force was used in Grenada (1983), Libya (1986), Panama (1989),
Iraq (1991, 1993, 1996), Somalia (1992), and Haiti (1994). This is not to
say that the legal arguments advanced on each of these occasions were valid
or accepted by other states or by international institutions-but it substanti-
ates the claim that international law is something of a force to be reckoned
with to the point where states invoke its terms to rationalize their behavior
as well as to communicate the reasons for action to the outside world, so
that it is unwise to give it such short shrift in the manner and spirit of the
remark made by Dean Acheson.
Through the use of the law as language, we can then identify strands of
opinio juris thought in state behavior (that is, incidents in state practice)-an
essential legal ingredient in the creation of custom which, in turn, produces
a normative system more reflective of the interests of its addressees. With
its extraordinary dynamic and adaptability, custom is especially appropriate
as a dialect of international law for allowing states to respond to complex
emergencies or unanticipated crises, or perhaps to depart from treaty texts
when appropriate. It promises solutions within-and this is important-a
normative framework and rests on the assumption that states are indeed ra-
tional actors, able to appreciate the nature and the consequences of the deci-
sions they make. 5 The rationality of an act is also communicated to other
14. CRAYFs, supra note 13, at 4 (emphasis added).
15. Citing President Nixon's 1971 statement, that "the rhetoric in international affairs
does make a difference," Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband point out that "conduct
explained by principles inconsistent with those applied previously in similar circumstances,
tends to transform the system. This means that the other superpower in the future will ex-
pect to have recourse to the same principles." THOMAS M. FRANCK AND EDWARD WEISBAND,
WORD POLrMCS: VERBAL STRATEGY AMONG THE SUPERPOWERS 2, 6 (1972) (emphasis
added). In such cases, the language of law is no more than "verbal strategy" and part of the
complex matrix of power, employed to rationalize the use (and abuse) of power. But, as
[Vol. 34
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states through the medium of law: states can afford to be specific about the
legal principles which they seek to invoke when they are confident in their
claims; and where legal grounds are less obvious, states are prone to make
more general and polemical references to their territorial integrity, political
independence and, of course, their sovereignty.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LANGUAGE
The increasing purchase made on international law argument and inter-
pretation by states (including the most powerful) contributes to a vital new
dynamic in the history of international relations, with international law as an
autonomous force or power among nations. As such and in the same way as
power itself, international law prescribes its own limitations as a language
and discipline-in the methods and arguments it allows, in its sources, in
the interpretations and principles it accepts, and in its own modus operandi."5
the authors stress, the full picture involves more than two superpowers; these superpowers
operate in a world of other, though lesser, powers and one which is also proliferated by in-
ternational institutions and other actors: "action explained by a principle inconsistent with
prior conduct is likely to cost the actor in prestige among other states, not only because
consistency is a part of everyone's definition of justice but also because all states have a
stake in the stability of the system above and beyond their stake in a particular issue con-
fronting this system." l at 6-7. Thus, not only an appreciation of the meaning of sover-
eignty, but recognition of the legal position generally held by states during the Cold War is
what led the International Court of Justice to conclude in the Nicaragua Case (1986) that it
could not "contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up the right of intervention by
one state against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideol-
ogy or political system." 1986 I.C.J. RP. 14, 133, para. 263. Furthermore, the Court was
not convinced that the so-called principle of ideological intervention was advanced in any-
thing other than "a political context"; the principle was "not advanced as legal arguments."
Id. at 134, para. 266.
16. See, for example, the argument made by Rosalyn Higgins on the scope of the right
of self-determination in the post-colonial world:
Can terms be invoked to mean whatever the user finds it convenient for them to
mean? I am aware that I here approach the dangerous waters of linguistics and
the current controversies of deconstructionism. My position is that I believe that
legal ideas develop, and that that is proper. But that is not to say that they can
mean simply whatever those using them want them to mean.
Rosalyn H-iggins, Comments, in PEOPLES AND MINoRrrIE5 iN Ih RNATIONAL LAW 29, 30
(Catherine Br6lmann et al. eds., 1993). International law is not therefore a promiscuous
language; it survives post-modern decadence by its institution and identity as a discipline
based on principles and rules, helped by its various sources and canons of construction, as
Higgins demonstrates in her argument about who the "right" of self-determination belongs
to in international law:
The [1966] Political Covenant gives entirely discrete rights to minorities on the
one hand (minority rights, as elaborated in Article 27) and to peoples (self-
determination rights, as provided in Article 1). One cannot-though many today
try, lawyers as well as politicians-assert that minorities are peoples and that
therefore minorities are entitled to the right of self-determination. This is sim-
ply to ignore the fact that the Political Covenant provides for two discrete rights.
7
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It also has an expanding base of users. In discussing the various claims
made for Palestinian statehood, Professor James Crawford observes the
provenance international law has in contemporary political debate and dia-
logue. An "obstinate fact [identical to the synopses of American practice
related above] remains that the actors, most of the time, continue to use the
language of law in making and assessing claims."17 Once again, this is not
pursuant to any legal obligation on such actors to do so, but resorting to le-
gal language appears to yield a greater prima facie advantage to one's case
in the international sphere than resorting to the sheer force of arms-which,
in any event, is shunned by legal doctrine and thinking.
International law offers a much more constructive communicative me-
dium (with all the prospects and risks that this entails) than naked power
could ever hope to do. Its very rules promise peace; they preach pacifism."8
Compared with power, its old rival, international law creates the conditions
for a genuine peace (based on negotiation and cooperation rather than threat,
intimidation, and force) and a stable peace (which is protected by law and
not by the balance of power). This peace is the platform for the prosperity
of the system's participants. In so doing, international law widens its cir-
cumference to include all states-be they strong or weak, wealthy or impov-
erished, large or small-as participants in the international system, poten-
tially able to speak and use the same language, the same principles. They
are able to appeal to reason, the same ideas, the same sense of justice: as Sir
Robert Y. Jennings, onetime President and former Judge of the International
Court of Justice, has observed: "the first and essential general principle of
public international law is its quality of universality; that is to say, that it be
recognized as a valid and applicable law in all countries, whatever their
cultural, economic, sociopolitical, or religious histories and traditions."' 9
It also, more insidiously, denies the right of self-determination to those to whom
it was guaranteed-the peoples of a state in their entirety.
Id. at 32. What is at stake here is the need for respect for the rules of recognition (to draw
from the terminology of Professor H.L.A. Hart, THE CoNcEPr OF LAw (2d ed. 1994) in the
international legal system). For an analysis of the Hartian rule of recognition and its appli-
cation to international law as "adherence [to a normative hierarchy] and community," see
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 751-59
(1988). Franck describes Hart's rule of recognition as one of "ultimate" validity, that
which "test[s] the validity of all other rules by standards that are not themselves subjected
to being tested by reference to any superior rule" and this is praised as a "much more so-
phisticated critique of the international rule system than the simple Austinian one, which
focuses on the absence of a system of coercion." Id. at 751.
17. James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?, 1
EuR. J. INr'L L. 307, 307 (1990).
18. This fundamental principle is enunciated in Articles 2(3) and 33 of the United Na-
tions Charter.
19. Robert Y. Jennings, Universal International Law in a Multicultural World, in
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Previous to this, power preached the politics of elitism and coercion: only
those states or polities powerful enough could speak-or, rather, only the
powerful that spoke would be heard.
International law, then, is constructive because it provides a voice and a
language for a greater range of participants in the international system, in-
cluding those who have traditionally been excluded from the great power ri-
valries of yesteryear: minorities, indigenous peoples, non-governmental or-
ganizations, and individuals.0 Some, however, regard this voice as barely
audible; others venture to say that it is the very acoustics of the system-
rather than its communicative medium-that are at fault. This latter obser-
vation casts doubt on the promise of international law to be more inclusive
than a system based on power imperatives and differentials: it is regarded as
elitist unto itself (with its statist-driven philosophies and initiatives) and as
having perpetrated its own system of exclusionary politics.21  Be this as it
may, international law is still (at base) more amenable to more claims by
more participants on more issues than under any regime based on power. It
is the machinations of internal change, vision, and reform that continue to
refer international law back to its original ideas of peace and justice that will
hold it accountable to changing community needs and expectations.
Notwithstanding these (and other) vices, the virtues of this language
should continue to be sung. As an alternative to the belligerent pursuit of
"self-determination' and the independence wars in the localized Balkans
power-play after 1991, the recent strategy of the federal government of Can-
ada to explore the legal meaning of self-determination comes as an instruc-
tive (if not timely) antidote. Here, the Canadian government has asked its
Supreme Court for a reference on whether the planned secession of the
French-speaking province of Quebec is in accordance with constitutional
and international law. Although the provincial authorities have refused to
participate in this process (Lucien Bouchard, the Premier of Quebec, has
spoken of Quebec's "sacred right" to control its own destiny), what we are
witnessing is international law in motion before a national court-with the
opinions of international law experts ready-at-hand, the submissions of ami-
20. See id.
21. For criticisms made by the "feminist approaches" to international law, see Hilary
Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. IhT'L L. 613
(1991) (See especially page 625 and accompanying footnotes). Such approaches pride
themselves on "the importance of participation, of listening to accounting for the particular
experiences of women, especially those that are on the margins of power," but face their
own difficulties when they encounter movements that promote practices contrary to their
objectives. Tracy Iiggins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism and Human Rights, 19 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 91 (1996). See also the criticism made by Philip Allott that the "social
world of humanity has been neither democratised nor socialised because humanity has cho-
sen to regard its international world as an unsocial world" and, as such, revolutionary
change is called for. PHILP ALLOTr, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL REvo-
LuTON: RECONCEiVINGrTHE WORLD 8 (1989).
22. See Anthony DePalma, Canada Seeks Legal Advice on the Status of Quebec, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1998, at A5.
9
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cus curiae, and stock-in-trade international law issues such as the meaning
of self-determination and the identity of the bearer(s) of such a right.' As
this vexed question moves into the Supreme Court of Canada, we can appre-
ciate the extent to which international law is given credence in world capi-
tals; in this case, a calculated and some might say an innovative gamble on
how to crack an old chestnut in the country's constitutional politics and
history.
So the language of international law has become such an integral part of
state behavior that it has entered the vernacular of domestic political dis-
course. The power of the words and ideas (and their respective histories) in
this language has also contributed to their impact on contemporary political
thinking. Perhaps this is best exemplified by one of the most powerful
words to have been coined in this century: that of "genocide." Devised by
the Polish scholar Rafael Lemkin in his famous work, Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe, 24 it was adopted and defined by international law in the 1948 United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.25 So
important is the resonance of this term in the contemporary world that con-
ventional wisdom asserts that it was studiously avoided in American corri-
dors of power in 1994, when Rwanda was convulsed by internecine warfare.
The reason given for this is that the use of the term "genocide" would have
increased public pressure to intervene in the conflict, 6 when many govern-
23. See Janice Tibbetts, Sovereigntist Argument Wrong, Canadians A People, Ottawa
Says, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 14, 1998, at A8 (outlining the Federal Govern-
ment's rebuttal of the claim that the Canadians do not constitute a "people": (a) that under
the Canadian Constitution, Parliament represents all Canadian people; (b) that French-
speaking Canadians outside Quebec have constitutional rights that protect their language
and culture; (c) that most English-speaking Canadians are not English Canadians in terms
of their origin; and (d) that Canada possesses a multicultural heritage). For an excellent
electronic resource prepared by the Canadian Department of Justice for the documentation
for this litigation, consult <http://canada.justice.gc.ca./Orientations/secess/index_en.html>.
24. RAFAELLEMK[ , Axis RULE iNOccuPImr EURoPE (1944).
25. See 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951). Article 2 of the Convention defines "genocide" as:
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflict-
ing on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Although the Convention relates to the "prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide," its emphasis very much sides with the latter of these strategies. See, particu-
larly, Article 3 (lists the acts that are punishable); Article 4 (deals with the act of punish-
ment); Article 5 (requirement for effective penalties) and Article 6 (the importance of a
competent tribunal). This is without prejudice to Article 1, according to which states un-
dertake to prevent and punish the crime of genocide in international law and Article 8,
whereby any contracting Party "may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations
to take such action under the [United Nations Charter] for the prevention and suppression
of genocide."
26. See Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton to Visit Rwanda on Africa Trip: Airport Event
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ments were running shy of foreign military entanglement in the post-
Somalia world. President Clinton admitted as much in March 1998 when,
on the tarmac of Kigali Airport, he elected to use this word from the inter-
national law lexicon (and, in so doing, hinted at the legal implications of the
categorization):
The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear
its share of responsibility for this tragedy .... We did not act quickly
enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee
camps to become safe haven[s] for the killers. We did not immediately
call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change
the past. But we can and must do everything in our power to help you
build a future without fear, and full of hope.
Each in their own way, these examples serve to demonstrate that inter-
national law is a language which is a necessary part of a "process of com-
munication," 2 a process that is altogether different in nature from that to
which states (as political entities) have traditionally been accustomed to.
This is because governments have created "formal arenas for certain matters,
unwittingly inviting consolidations of authority and control that will be used
in ways adverse to common interests." 29 Of course, this opens up a series of
fundamental and recurrent questions-about compliance with and enforce-
ment of the law-but it is the very existence, speaking and use of legal lan-
guage that allows us to ask (and answer) such questions in the first place.
V. CONCLUSION
This brief essay has explored the idea of international law as a language
for international relations-and it has done so in a comparative and histori-
cal framework. Using the language of power as its comparator, international
law is referred to as something of a "new" lingua gentium for state interac-
tion and dialogue, even though its origins may be traced back to the year of
1648 and the Peace Settlement of Westphalia. This historical dimension of
viewing international law as a serious rival language to that of power should
not be lost sight of and cannot be over-stressed. We must appreciate that the
learning of a completely new mode of communication-a new psychology
almost-will not happen overnight or even in a generation. International
law has centuries of a different language (with all the accompanying tradi-
Scheduled to 'Address and Acknowledge the Genocide', WASmNGTON PoST, Mar. 11, 1998,
at A26.
27. Clinton's Painful Words of Sorrow and Chagrin, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1998, at
A12 (emphasis added).
28. W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75
ASILPRoc. 101 (1981).
29. Id. at 120.
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tions) to overturn and replace. This is no mean or immediate task. But its
lurking presence in state capitals, in national courts, and in the corridors of
power means that international law has already made something of an im-
pressive and important start.30 International law should be able to take some
credit for the relative state of peace that exists as the twentieth century draws
to a close. Something dramatic has surely taken place in international poli-
tics in the past one hundred years or so if we consider that, at the end of the
last century, nations vied for armaments and colonial acquisitions whereas
today they are locked in fierce economic competition with each other and
are busy comparing their criminal justice systems in preparation for the
creation and institution of a permanent international criminal court.
It is worthwhile noting, in conclusion, that the metaphor of international
law as a language for international relations was the theme chosen for the
United Nations Congress on Public International Law in March 1995-the
first event of its kind to be held in the history of the organization. Former
United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has explained that "next to
the society of states, there is an international scientific community that de-
sires to establish law as a language of international relations."'" The full
thrust of the idea-it is true-has yet to take hold.32 Depicting law as lan-
30. In the field of international human rights law, for instance, the Human Rights
Committee created by the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only
has the power to "study the reports submitted by States Parties [and] shall transmit its re-
ports, and such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. A16316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 40(4).
While some may regard this system as rudimentary, powerless and unsatisfactory, the em-
phasis of this process has been on the establishment of "constructive dialogue" with states
in a comparatively new and radically different branch of the traditional international legal
order. See U.N. Doe. A/48/40 (1993), Part I, Annex X, 218. See also DOMINIC
MCGOLDRICK, TaB HUMAN RIGHTS CoMMrrE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEvELOPMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COvENANr ON CIvIL AND POLrniCAL RIGHTS 103 (1991). However, if we
consider that the Committee is a creature of the time of its creation, it is justified for us to
ask at what future point in time "constructive dialogue" should become more than an ex-
change of communications between states and institutions and develop into a series of le-
gally binding decisions (judgments) given by a court of law. See Yoram Dinstein, Human
Rights: Implementation Through the UN System, 89 ASIL PRoc. 242 (1995). This is espe-
cially so given the present system of individual communications set out in the First Op-
tional Protocol to the Covenant where the Committee only has power to "forward its views
to the State Party concerned and to the individual." First Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, art. 5(4).
31. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Foreword, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNrrT NATIONS
CONGRESS ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, NEw Yomx, MARCH 13-17, 1995: INrERNA-
TIONAL LAW AS A LANoUAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS xiv (1996) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS]. For additional information, see Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloy-
annis-Vrailas, The Work of the Sixth Committee at the Fiftieth Session of the U.N. General
Assembly, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 491, 499 (1996).
32. It is the view of the Finnish international lawyer Martti Koskenniemi, who at-
tended the 1995 United Nations Congress, that "a paradoxical contrast emerged [at the
Congress] between the inflated global rhetoric of the speeches and the complete irrelevance
with which the Congress was treated by the political centre." He continues: "Globalist
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guage in this way, however, presents the law as a creative (rather than de-
structive) alternative force in international relations because, as was said in
another context, "[fif only as a point of departure, the language of law and
constitutionalism can provide a common set of reference points for people
... who otherwise feel little in common."" We are aware, pace the opening
paragraph of this essay, of what the alternative may ultimately be: without
international law as language, "antagonists could converse only in the grunt-
and-click language of raw power, leaders would have no affective idiom for
justifying compromises to their followers, and third parties would lack any
prncled basis for bringing power to bear when sweetness and reason
fail." Moreover, through the law as a medium and through its use, we have
the makings of a genuine community with its own sense of identity, values,
vision, and solidarity."5 The foundations of permanent and stable world
peace require more than simple power-equation calculations and sensitivity
to the shifting power bases and differentials. Through international law, na-
tion shall finally be able to speak lasting and meaningful peace unto nation.
rhetoric: marginal practice-and none of us was surprised, indeed, nobody expected other-
wise." Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, 16 AUSTRALIAN Y.B.
INT'L LAW 1, 2 (1994) [hereinafter International Law]. He notes that "there was no sign of
awareness that international law might participate in [the] restructuring [of politics], not
only as a formal technique, to be employed at the service of diplomacy, but as the very site
for the expression of new ideas, identities or strategies." I& at 2. What is particularly in-
teresting and significant about the speeches presented at the Congress is the spectacular
absence (generally speaking) of the theme of international law as a language for interna-
tional relations. See PROCEEDiNGS supra note 31. Perhaps this is one reason why "we have
the sense that transformative language-democracy, interdependence, solidarity, shared
values-is mere decoration, in fact useless for participation in or understanding of prac-
tice." Koskenniemi, International Law, supra at 7. Or is the "truth of th[is] spectacle" ex-
plained by our alienation not only from practice but from related disciplines that cover the
same ground but use a different language? Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International
Law and International Relations Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. IN'r'L L. 205 (1993).
33. MARTHA L. MiNow, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, PoTimcs AND THE LAW 139
(1997).
34. Tom J. Farer, Conclusion: What Do International Lawyers Do When They Talk
About Ethnic Violence and Why Does It Matter?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIc
CONFLICr 326, 346 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
35. See generally JOHNEDWARDS, MULmTIUNGUAUSM 125-45 (1994).
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